

Do you need permission to save an unborn baby?



A Pro-Life study of power struggles within the Right to Life movement
and the comparison of two kinds of organization - Directorship vs. Coalition.

DO YOU NEED PERMISSION TO SAVE AN UNBORN BABY?

A Pro-Life Study of Power Struggles Within the
Right to Life Movement and a
Comparison of Two Kinds of Organization
Directorship vs. Coalition

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Committee to Defend Pro-Life Groups
(from attack by other pro-life groups)

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JUNE, 1977

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PREFACE

I have written what follows as one who has been active in Right to Life for many years and who is proud to be associated with pro-life groups. The Right to Life people I know have made so many sacrifices in defense of the unborn child that their efforts can justly be described as heroic. Their tremendous dedication is what gives us a chance to obtain a Human Life Amendment.

In defending human life, we Right to Life people are often subjected to vicious personal attacks — not only from pro-abortionists and the news media but also from those who give lip service to the cause but who in practice spring to the defense of pro-abortion politicians.

Tragically, however, there is one other source of the personal attacks. It is not only the pro-abortionists. It is not only the news media. It is not only those who give lip service. The most vicious personal attacks on Right to Life people often come from other Right to Life people.

In publicizing some examples of the fratricidal warfare, I hope to make it more difficult for such conflicts to be waged in the future. Furthermore, I think we can benefit from studying how these disputes developed. I believe I can show that there is a certain kind of situation in which the pro-life movement grows in numbers and effectiveness — and another kind of situation in which the pro-life movement turns in on itself and consumes its energies in bickering.

Let us start with an example from New York State — the state I personally know best. While the issues and personalities differ, experiences similar to New York have occurred in many states throughout the country.

CHAPTER 1

WHAT HAPPENED

THE NEW YORK STATE EXPERIENCE

In 1970, at the urging of Governor Nelson Rockefeller, the New York Legislature passed an abortion-on-demand law. In 1972 — only two years later — the New York Legislature reversed itself and voted to restore the pre-1970 law that prohibited abortion except where the mother's life was in danger. While a furious Nelson Rockefeller vetoed the Legislature's action, this turnabout of the New York Legislature within a two-year period was a remarkable achievement for the Right to Life movement. In fact, it still stands as the only time when a pro-abortion Legislature reversed itself. The action was all the more notable because a Republican Legislature refuted the powerful Republican Governor who was the undisputed leader of his party.

The victory was achieved for two reasons. First, the Right to Life forces had a skillful and dedicated legislative leader. His name was Senator James Donovan. For two years Donovan never gave up. At one point he even risked censure by his colleagues for insisting that they speak up in defense of the unborn child. Donovan responded that he would rather be in contempt of the New York Senate than in contempt of human life.

The second reason for Right to Life success was the tremendous work by many dedicated people throughout the state. Day after day we visited the assemblymen and state senators within our districts. We wrote letters and persuaded our friends to write also. In the final stages of the effort, we came to Albany by bus from all over New York State to lobby for human life.

During the period when the New York Right to Life movement was scoring its greatest success — reversing the Rockefeller abortion-on-demand law -- what sort of state organization did pro-life people have?

I am tempted to say we had no organization at all. But that is not correct. We actually had a most effective organization — but one that many people did not recognize as an organization because it operated as a coalition.

Prior to 1970, there was literally no state Right to Life organization except on paper. (For publicity purposes, the Catholic Church in New York State had put together the names of some people and placed them on a "New York State Right to Life" letterhead. In fact, however, the people involved never held a meeting and most of them never even met each other.)

After the passage of abortion-on-demand in 1970, a relatively small group of pro-life people from around the state held a meeting one day in Albany to exchange ideas. In 1971, a similar one day meeting was held. In both cases, because of the distances involved in New York State, the vast majority of pro-life people could not attend. But even one representative from an area was sufficient because the purpose of

these meetings was to exchange information in order to help each pro-life person and group to be more effective in their own districts.

At the time of its greatest success, therefore, New York State Right to Life" had no constitution and no dues. Most of all, it was understood by everyone that the once-a-year meeting was solely to serve for the benefit of local groups in exchanging ideas. There was no center of power — no small group of people to whom other people had to go to seek approval before doing anything. Yet the coalition was an important vehicle for communicating suggestions between groups. At the 1971 meeting, for example, a suggestion was made by two people that it might be good to hold a pro-life March in New York City. This was the beginning of a highly successful coalition effort which put together a March for Life in November 1971. Another 1971 suggestion was that, in order to insure that there was never a time when bus loads of pro-life people were not lobbying in Albany, it might be good to have a bus coordinator who would know the lobbying schedule of each group in New York State so that there would always be some group on the way to the State Capital.

As I mentioned, the one meeting in 1970 and the one meeting in 1971 were the only general meetings that New York State Right to Life had prior to its greatest legislative success. Both meetings were loosely organized — and both meetings operated on the assumption that no one group of people could dictate to another group but it would be helpful to exchange ideas so that all could be more effective. The relationship between pro-life people throughout the state was a friendly one. There were no power struggles to control the "center of influence" — because there was no center of influence. There were no long discussions over internal matters — because there was no red tape and no internal matters to discuss. All the effort was directed outwards — toward letter writing to our local legislators and lobbying both at home and in Albany. Often the pro-life people in one part of the state knew little of the pro-life people in another part, but we were all concentrating on the essential thing as much activity as possible in our local areas to influence our senators and assemblymen.

After the 1972 Legislative Success

It was after the great success of 1972 that the internal trouble started for Right to Life. With the best of good will people began to say "Let's form a more centralized organization. Let's have a constitution and by-laws. Let's collect dues. Let's set up an office near Albany and let's select a Board of Directors that can oversee Right to Life activity in the state."

The justification for all this was that such a structure was necessary if Right to Life was to be efficient and successful. (Tragically, the people who said that forgot that Right to Life had been most efficient and had achieved its greatest success in the absence of just such an organization.)

At any rate, having set up a central power, Right to Life people began to fight each other to control that center. Gradually a Right to Life bureaucracy began to emerge. More and more time was spent on internal communication and squabbling within the pro-life movement and less and less time was spent on the legislators. Internal organizational matters took up 90% of the time and energy of many pro-life people.'

Although the original New York Right to Life Constitution stressed that the organization would not attempt to dictate to local groups, the Board of Directors of New York State Right to Life soon began to think of themselves as the decision-makers for the pro-life movement in the state. A new Right to Life organizational philosophy began to emerge — namely, that it was wrong for other people to attempt Right to Life projects unless the approval of the Board had first been obtained.

Let's take a specific example and show what this new principle did to the New York pro-life movement.

The Call for the Constitutional Convention

In January 1973 the Supreme Court brought abortion-on-demand to the entire country. Thus it was no longer possible for pro-life groups in New York State to work for Senator Donovan's bill to reverse the Rockefeller abortion law. Now it was necessary to work on the Federal level for a Human Life Constitutional Amendment.

Did this mean that the strength Right to Life had built up in the New York State Legislature would have to be abandoned? A Long

¹As an example of how bureaucratic concerns can supplant the purpose for which an organization was established, let us jump for a moment from 1973 to 1976. In their fiscal report covering Oct. 1, 1975 through Aug. 31, 1976 (the most recent fiscal report before this booklet was published), New York State Right to Life reports that it spent \$40,136.74 for its Albany office expenses. Only \$1,842.84 was spent for "Legislative Program (Federal)".

In addition to the fiscal report of 1975-76, the projected budget for 1976-77 reveals a similar pattern. Out of a projected budget of \$109,322, only 1 per cent

or \$1200 — is allocated for Federal legislation. In other words, if you gave \$1 to New York State Right to Life, only 1 of that dollar would be allocated to Federal legislation such as the Right to Life constitutional amendment.

Moving to pro-life activity relative to the State Legislature, the New York State Right to Life minutes (June 4, 1976 meeting) provide this description of the relationship that existed between the state and local groups

The Survey Reports that were sent out were quite revealing and showed that many of the groups did not know who their Assemblymen and Senators were in their districts and that some groups had never met their Area Director.

In summary, after our years of operation as a highly structured entity, a period in which New York State Right to Life received hundreds of thousands of dollars, many of the local affiliates did not know the names of their Assemblymen and Senators. ..some had never met their Area Directors. ..and only 1% of the budget was allocated to Federal legislation.

Compare this to the pre-1973 effectiveness of the pro-life movement in New York — prior to the establishment of a Right to Life bureaucracy!

Island pro-life lawyer named Gene McMahon studied this question and concluded that state legislatures could be very effective in obtaining a constitutional amendment if they would begin to call for a constitutional convention on Right to Life as a way of prodding Congress into action.

Here we must digress for a moment to point out that there are two ways of amending the Constitution. The first way is by a 2/3 vote of the House and the Senate — followed by ratification by 3/4 of the states. The second way is by a constitutional convention — followed by ratification by 3/4 of the states.

In other words, the convention is a substitute for the role Congress normally plays in the amending process. Under Article V of the Constitution, Congress is mandated to call a convention when 2/3 of the state legislatures request it. Congress does not like to see itself by-passed, and McMahon felt he could show through history that state calls for a constitutional convention were an effective means to prod Congress into action. He believed such an approach was far more likely to succeed than the other possible action a state could take — namely, the passage of a resolution requesting Congress to support a Human Life Amendment. Unlike the call for a convention, a state resolution requesting Congress to act (technically called a "memorializing resolution") is not binding on Congress and can be ignored by the House and the Senate — even if such a resolution is passed by all fifty states.

As had been his custom in the past, McMahon wrote his ideas down and sent a copy to a number of pro-life people that he thought might be interested.

One of the people to whom he sent his research paper was the hero of the New York legislative effort — State Senator James Donovan.

And here is where the trouble started. There were a number of people on the Board of Directors of New York State Right to Life who felt that McMahon should not have made a suggestion to Senator Donovan without first obtaining their permission. In their view, McMahon should have come to them for such permission. Then, if they gave it to him, he would have been allowed to talk with Senator Donovan. If they turned him down, however, then he would not have been allowed.

Not everybody on the Board of Directors felt this way. Some Directors continued to insist that New York State Right to Life should operate as a coalition and had no right to prevent McMahon or others from making suggestions to Donovan or anyone else they wished. Still others on the Board of Directors were more concerned with the pros and cons of McMahon's argument and not about the question of whether he should have sought permission.

As a Long Islander, Gene McMahon was well known to Long Island Right to Life people but relatively unknown to pro-life people in other parts of the state. Long Island began to rally to Gene's defense while many of the upstate Right to Lifers organized against his proposal.

With this as background, we come to the October 1973 convention of the New York State Right to Life. Unaware that Right to Life

people were no longer supposed to recommend legislation to him unless they first obtained permission, Senator Donovan gave a speech at the Right to Life convention in which he strongly endorsed the call for a constitutional convention and announced his sponsorship of just such a bill in the New York Legislature.

Now it might be thought that, since Donovan was such a hero to Right to Life, his endorsement of the call for a convention would end debate upon the subject. But such was not the case. A majority of the Board of Directors were so opposed to the convention call that they were to speak out strongly against the Donovan position. It was suggested that Donovan was not smart enough to recognize the dangers of calling for a constitutional convention. The Board of Directors of New York State Right to Life were more clever than Donovan and could see the problems. Donovan was not experienced enough as a legislator to understand the legislative difficulties involved. (After all, he was only the legislator who outmaneuvered Governor Rockefeller to obtain passage of the pro-life bill in 1972.) The Board of Directors of New York State Right to Life knew more about the legislative process than Donovan did.

Under the Constitution of New York State Right to Life as it existed at that time, the final decision-making body was the General Assembly. In the General Assembly, every organization that had paid \$100 to join New York State Right to Life could have three votes — if they sent that many delegates to the annual convention. Because of this provision in their Constitution, the anti-convention majority of the Board of Directors received a jolt at the October 1973 convention in Syracuse. After hours of debate, the General Assembly rejected their advice and supported Senator Donovan.

It was a totally unexpected outcome...A majority of the Board of Directors were convinced that they were stronger than the Long Island representation at the convention. And this was true. But what happened to the Board was that there were a number of other people present who found it simply incredible that New York State Right to Life was on the verge of rejecting Senator Donovan. As a block, these people voted with the Long Islanders and suddenly New York State Right to Life was on record as backing a proposal that a majority of the Board of Directors firmly opposed.

The Hugh Carey Situation

The next year (March 1974) another vigorous discussion took place within New York State Right to Life. A Right to Life group from Long Island had come to the conclusion that Congressman Hugh Carey, then a relatively unknown candidate for governor, was unfavorable to the pro-life cause. This conclusion had been reached because Carey had written a blunt letter to them announcing his strong support for Federal funding of abortion under Medicaid. (Carey was then a member of the House Ways and Means Committee. Two years later, as Governor of New York, he would gladden the hearts of pro-abortionists

by dramatically vetoing a bill that would have required parental consent for abortions on minors.) As a result of his pro-abortion letter, the Long Island group introduced a resolution at the next New York State Right to Life Convention to express strong opposition to Carey's view and to urge that Carey's stand be publicized throughout New York State.

While knowing little about Carey, most of the Board of Directors united against the proposal. Why? The only apparent reason was that, since it came from Long Island, accepting such a proposal could indicate that the Long Island people had caught on to Hugh Carey before the Board itself had. Therefore, despite his letter, the Long Islanders must be wrong and Carey could not be so bad for Right to Life.

Once again the Board of Directors suffered a disappointment. By a narrow margin the Long Island resolution passed the General Assembly. Once again the margin of victory was provided by those allied with neither of the competing Right to Life groups — the "independents" who read for themselves what Carey had said in his letter.

Restructuring the Constitution

At this point, a majority on the Board of Directors had suffered two frustrating experiences in a row. Twice they had opposed a proposal which came from the "wrong Right to Life people" — and twice the General Assembly had overruled them. The obvious solution was to restructure New York State Right to Life to keep the General Assembly from over-ruling them in the future. And that is exactly what the Board of Directors accomplished.

The Constitution was changed to provide that the Board of Directors and not the General Assembly would be the decision-making power. In addition, a second change was made in the way Directors would be selected. According to the new Constitution of New York State Right to Life, the 15 congressional districts in upstate New York would have 15 members on the Board of Directors — one director for every congressional district. The 24 congressional districts in downstate New York would have 8 representatives on the Board of Directors — an average of one director for every three congressional districts. As icing on the cake, the Long Island groups would be restricted to two of the eight.

In summary, the upstate areas would have 65% of the Right to Life directors — although they had only 38% of the state's population. The downstate areas would have 35% of the Right to Life directors, although they had 62% of the state's population.

This Constitutional change was approved and the arrangement still prevails in New York State Right to Life.

The Outcome

Having changed the Constitution, those controlling New York

State Right to Life abandoned Senator Donovan's call for a convention. Very quietly they undercut Donovan by approaching other legislators and asking these legislators to introduce a memorializing resolution rather than a call for a constitutional convention.

Thus, within a short period of time, the New York State Right to Life organization had accomplished the following:

- 1) It had rebuffed the courageous legislative leader of 1972, State Senator James Donovan.
- 2) It had generated such internal fighting among Right to Life groups that anything proposed by one part of the Right to Life movement would immediately be opposed by the other.
- 3) Instead of promoting unity within the state, vast numbers of pro-life people had dropped out of New York State Right to Life while those who remained had centralized power within a very small group -- thus preventing most future volunteers from having any voice in the decision-making process.
- 4) The Constitution had been' gerrymandered so as to insure the control of one group of Right to Life people over another.

The result? The Right to Life movement in New York State is far weaker than it was in 1972 before it formed its highly structured state organization. In the last five years, it has gone steadily downhill.

At present, the Long Island Right to Life people continue to support a call for a constitutional convention. New York State Right to Life, however, not only opposes such a call but is working as hard as it can to defeat such efforts in the State Legislature. In its literature, the state organization has classified the convention call with euthanasia bills as legislation not to be favored. Pro-life legislators who were on record as favoring a call for a constitutional convention have been lobbied to change their position. The lobbying comes not from the pro-abortionists but from Right to Life people.

In its most far-reaching act, New York Right to Life wrote to the state legislators in January 1977 to inform them publicly of the division within the pro-life movement. The letter began as follows:

There has been much in certain newspapers that some splintered pro-life groups will lobby this legislative session for convention call. New York State Right to Life has taken a firm stand against such a legislative move. We maintain our trust, and our respect, for established legislative procedures.

This letter marked the first time that a Right to Life group in New York had publicized to the state legislators the internal divisions within Right to Life. It was also the first time that a Right to Life group had actively lobbied against a piece of pro-life legislation that was sponsored by legislators sympathetic to the Right to Life cause.

How did the legislators themselves react to this new situation? According to one pro-life assemblyman, the initial response was one of shock and disbelief among pro-life legislators -- and glee among pro-

abortion legislators. A second pro-life assemblyman gave this evaluation

New York State Right to Life Committee's 'splinter group' letter is the most damaging force to the Right to Life movement in the last five years in the State of New York. That very letter is being used by pro-abortion forces...

As a State Legislator, I can assure you of the personal damage.

And, looking back, it can all be attributed to the following: a center of power was set up and Right to Life people battled among themselves to control that center of power. The internal concerns of the organization began to dominate over the goals of the Right to Life movement. And those who sought to do as they had prior to 1972 -when the coalition arrangement had succeeded — found their efforts shot down by New York State Right to Life when they had not first sought permission. Legislators who listened to anybody but New York State Right to Life found their pro-life legislation actively opposed by Right to Life people.

In summary, if the pro-abortion forces themselves had devised a master plan to destroy Right to Life strength in New York, they could not have done a better job.

NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE — THE FIRST MONTHS

In its present form National Right to Life began in 1973. The organization took shape at a June convention in Detroit. Ed Golden of New York narrowly defeated Marjorie Mecklenburg of Minnesota in a contest for president of National Right to Life. Mrs. Mecklenburg, however, was elected chairman of the Board and a struggle between the Golden and Mecklenburg factions dominated the first year of National Right to Life's existence. Perhaps the best way to illustrate the atmosphere is to quote from some of the National Right to Life Directors themselves.¹

Excerpt from a National Right to Life Director's Report of the National Right to Life Committee Meeting in Washington that was held between January 18-20, 1974.

The national assembly was another marathon, 31 hours of meetings compressed into 2-1/2 days.

The final agenda (Sunday) unleashed a maelstrom of parliamentary ploys, denunciations, and indictments and left no provision for breakfast, lunch, toilet or ablutions; so that the conclave ended three hours beyond schedule as waiters moved in with tables, chairs and setups for a tax protestors' banquet.

Prior to the convention, some delegates had predicted changes were imminent, like the resignations of President Ed Golden and Chairman of the Board, Marge Mecklenburg, thus bringing a salutary solution to personality/philosophical deadlock.

Understanding the tussle requires this simplistic overview: a loose confederation of Mecklenburg adherents believes that Right to Life should be a "grass roots" type of operation — ideas fed from the various states and implemented by the office in Washington. The opposing view of Golden and his allies is that "authoritarian" is the best way to begin, that is, chieftains in Washington instructing those in the boondocks. Count Judy Fink (Pa.), Dr. Fortman (No. Dak.), Robert Greene (Ky.), Prof. Witherspoon (Tex.), in the Mecklenburg camp, totaling five fixed votes.

In Golden's group, only Michael Taylor (who works for Msgr. James McHugh in Washington) was a fixed ally. Gloria Klein (Mich.), who was often found voting with Golden, couldn't stand the crossfire and has renounced the heat to go back to the kitchen. She quit on Sunday.

. . . (Another) member of the Committee is Dr. John C. Willke (Ohio) who moves independently.

¹ Whenever excerpts from documents appear in this work, I have a copy of the original in my files and I have also sought to check with other sources to verify the facts contained in the document. With regard to evaluations that express concern about the work of National Right to Life, I recognize that some of the authors could be in a difficult position if I revealed their names publicly. Unless specific permission has been given to use their names, I have not done so.

A powerful force is Dr. Mildred Jefferson, vice-chairman of the Board, a physician from Boston who is likely, on critical issues, to be voting the Mecklenburg line.

As was said, it was expected that this entire group would step aside and from their departure could arise a phoenix to start anew. No such thing transpired. Marge clung to the chair, and although Ed resigned the Presidency around noon time of that final Sunday, he somehow reclaimed the post during a coffee break.

Four women delegates wept in open assembly over the weekend and one other removed from the room in hysteria. But while they released these tears imported from Colorado, Michigan, Oklahoma, Nebraska and Arkansas (by proxy), other delegates largely ignored the bathos, relentlessly pursuing some sort of business. A final reckoning included agreement on wording for a Constitutional Amendment (the text put in limbo until it can be checked with Cong. Hogan, Sen. Buckley, et al); the firing of Robert Greene as executive director, and the resignation of one member of the nine-person Board (Gloria Klein). Little parameters of power were preserved; little cliques of personality were polarized, and a determination was made to hold another assembly in June in Washington by the same group.

About the business: although fired as executive director, Greene stays on the Executive Committee to help to audit his successor and presumably to adhere to the Mecklenburg party line.

Top man in the Washington office now is Rev. Warren Schaller, an Episcopal minister from Minneapolis, who has been a chief source of irritation to President Golden.

Greene, waiting his dismissal over the weekend . . . spoke from the podium submissively, low-key, apologetically (one heard earlier that as top banana he came over too aggressively.) Greene resigned at 2:30 p.m. Sunday, finishing his valedictory in sobs. He left the podium to a standing ovation and waved aside importunities to remain on for a month . . . He was budgeted at \$50,000 a year, salary and expenses, and was innovator and author of the "Greene Sheet," a weekly newsletter from Washington headquarters. The National Right to Life Committee has spent \$150,000 to date (June, 1973 to January, 1974).

Rev. Schaller, object of much controversy, may be tuning in his antenna for the other shoe to drop. (A provision has been written that the next Executive Director, when found, can hire, fire, reshuffle headquarters personnel at will. Schaller would be working under the new gaffer).

Schaller is splendidly groomed, polite and cooperative. The toes of his shoes turn up as though he has been for some months back on his heels. He has given up his pastorate, relocated his family from Minneapolis, fathered a new baby and may be excused for an occasional shiver, imagining the draft of a Siberian wind beckoning his relocation to Minnesota . . .

Dr. John C. Willke, . . . was a leavening force and preached several impromptu homilies in behalf of peace, as though keeping in form for

his lecture tours. His wife, Barbara, nee Hiltz, is related to the Cincinnati publishing company that prints the Willke literature. Lack Willke's credentials in facing — and mollifying — dissimilar, hostile audiences comes through clearly. He nominated a New Orleans Lawyer to go in search of the New Executive Director, whoever and wherever that man on horseback may be.

Dr. Mildred Jefferson, the black woman surgeon of Boston . . . is at once tender and unyielding. In debate she is tough. Socially, she is a charmer. She is a great extemporaneous speaker and can exhort for an hour without notes. She disavowed being a "captive" of Mrs. Mecklenburg and said she votes on principle.

Two delegates largely monopolized the floor microphones in parliamentary maneuvers, Martin McKernan of New Jersey and Lay Bowman of Atlanta, Georgia . . . The example of these two proliferated among the other delegates so that Roberts Rules of Order became the document of the day, and a professional parliamentarian was hired to help unscramble the weekend omelet . . .

Best impression of the convention: Alice Hartle — current editor of National Right to Life News — mother of nine — chief lobbyist in Minnesota (began in 1969 twisting legislative arms, unschooled then in politics, has left a great heritage for successful organization in Minnesota). Good editor, tough lobbyist, implacable, little emotion, personally charming. Disappointed at sparse subscription returns on introductory issue of Right to Life newspaper. Mailed 800,000 copies — returns for paid subscriptions — blah!

The two adversaries: Marjorie Mecklenburg, chairman, and Ed Golden, president, in studied roles:

Mrs. Mecklenburg, after running the meeting for 2-1/2 days (as chairman) she was maneuvered by a parliamentary ploy into getting into the witness chair for a free-lance interrogation — defending employment of Rev. Schaller, mailing of by-laws, not mailing of minutes, accommodations with pals, circumventing of foes. Her greatest test came when Kenneth Vander Hoef of Seattle, a trial lawyer, put her to cross-examination. She conceded no indiscretions, articulated her views with clarity, precision, ended up in a standoff with her interrogators.

Ed Golden, Great Architect of the N.Y. Experience — overturning the liberal law (only to see Governor Rockefeller veto it). Proponent of "authoritarian" type of operation. Claims roots of dissension started when, after his election, a "democratic" type of grass roots approach was pushed on him. Bristles at committee type of operation. ("Every time you want to cough, you have to get committee concurrence."). Conceded employment of Rev. Schaller for temporary post but not as Executive Director. Lost cool when committee, in conference telephone call, put Schaller over as "interim executive director" . . . Feels he has gone the extra mile in compromise, but inability to hire a good Executive Director "who isn't allowed to run the show" has frustrated, disenchanted him.

(After returning home from Executive Committee meetings, Golden said it took him a day to cool off.)

Now Golden has his chance. Greene has resigned, but so has Golden's leavener on the Executive Committee, Gloria Klein of Michigan. Fear not. Golden is sure to fill that vacancy with Ken Vander Hoef of Seattle, his cross-examiner .

Golden ended his Sunday "unity" speech with these words: "The National Right to Life Committee in the next five months could become one of the finest, strongest, formidable organizations in the nation. I would like to be a part of it."

There were 51 delegates present at the convention, including proxies. They cried like herald angels for Unity while excising Dissent.

. . . Temporary surcease reigns in the wake of several accomplishments: rout of our real opponents on the Helms Amendment; agreement on wording for a constitutional amendment; a path opened to find a "big" Executive Director for Washington headquarters; and a splendid rally on the first anniversary of Black Monday.

But who will answer the wanton guest:
Who is going to give way.

Excerpt from a Second National Right to Life Director's Evaluation of National Right to Life:

WHAT NRLC HAS NOT DONE:

I think NRLC could have done each of the following during the past five months. To my knowledge, it has done none.

Congress

- (1) No significant progress in Congress.
- (2) No plan for progress in Congress.
- (3) Little progress toward setting up conditions needed to win in Congress.
- (4) No effort to choose those legislators most worthy of defeat.
- (5) No effort to research material which can be used to defeat congressmen.
- (6) No determination of which congressmen are committed our way or their way or which way others are leaning, or what is necessary to get more votes.

Excerpt from a Third National Right to Life Director's Evaluation of National Right to Life:

The Executive Committee of NRLC has consistently failed to bring critical matters relating to organizational policies and structure and important pro-life legislation at the Federal level to NRLC directors and to their grass roots supporters. Specifically this failure has manifested itself in the following actions:

- (a) The hiring of a political consultant firm with a questionable pro-life commitment and no solid experience in the pro-life movement and pro-life legislation, at a substantial salary, PRIOR to the hiring of an Executive Director and competent staff capable of directing, evaluating and acting upon the advice and information provided by the consultant firm.
- (b) The release of the NRLC — Human Life Amendment to the media despite the existence of a resolution unanimously adopted at the January Board meeting placing an embargo on the amendment until such time as written notification of Congressional reaction could be provided to all Board of Directors and further examination of the amendment at the grass roots level.
- (c) The failure of the Executive Committee to acknowledge much less act upon three key pro-life resolutions passed at the Northeastern Regional Conference in N.Y. at Syracuse in the Fall of 1973.

To date, no major piece of pro-life legislation at the federal level or no major HEW or AID action has been initiated and/or digested and communicated by specific actions of the EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE or the NRLC Directors as a unified body.

This task has been carried out by other national groups which have neither the financial base nor the paid staff of NRLC yet have been very successful in getting through Congress pro-life legislation and bureaucratic changes of policy. Their action has been supported by individual directors acting on their own initiative and basing their actions on research and information of these independent national agencies.

. If the minutes of these monthly Executive Committee meetings reflect anything at all, it is that the major preoccupation of that group is itself and not the unborn child or other victims of the anti-life establishment.

I have checked the minutes of all of the 1973 National Right to Life meetings — including a number of conference phone calls by members of the Executive Committee. Less than 2% of the time was spent on productive efforts relating to a Human Life Amendment. 98% of the time was devoted either to bureaucratic concerns or to the internal power struggle going on within National Right to Life.

At times the minutes clearly reveal the anger that was boiling close to the surface. Ed Golden hung up on one conference call. On another occasion, the supporters of Mrs. Mecklenburg complained that people from Minnesota were being discriminated against.

The climax of the first six months' conflict arrived in December 1973. Ed Golden attempted to call a meeting of the full 50-member Board of Directors where he felt he had a majority. The Mecklenburg faction questioned whether Golden had used the proper form in getting directors to petition for a full Board meeting. Ed Golden contacted

many of the directors anyway and a group of them showed up on December 8. Thereupon a spirited debate began as to whether the meeting involved the Executive Board only or the full Board of Directors. Robert Greene, the NRLC Executive Director, raised a point of order followed by a point of parliamentary procedure in an attempt to block directors not on the Executive Committee from any decision- making role at the meeting.

And what about the money that was spent during this period? We find, for example, that National Right to Life spent no less than \$27,000 on telephone calls between June 1973 and January 1974. Yet the minutes of the conference phone calls reveal that not one moment of conference phone time was devoted to efforts towards getting a Human Life Amendment.

\$27,000!!!

The fighting that existed within National Right to Life extended also to different factions on the state level. As an example, when Randy Engel of the U.S. Coalition for Life received permission from Birch Bayh's subcommittee to testify before them in 1974, another pro-life leader from Mrs. Engel's home state of Pennsylvania, in an unsuccessful attempt to have the Engel appearance cancelled, angrily wrote the following to Bayh:

9 August 1974

Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Re: Buckley Amendment Hearings
Session of 21 August 1974

My Dear Senator:

Today, I was in contact with Mr. William Heckman about the persons who would speak to the abortion issue from the pro-life side. I expressed my utter dismay upon hearing that Randy Engel of U.S. Coalition for Life and Pat Goltz of Feminists for Life would be given opportunity to testify, when my own request of as long ago as last February has been denied.

PHL represents people from across this Commonwealth, and all of the people named on this letterhead have been selected by local groups from one end of the state to another. Still we have no voice.

On the other hand, Randy Engel operates from her own dining room table. She is elected by no one, and simply publishes a periodical representative of the narrowest interpretation of Roman Catholic positions, to which most moderates among them do not subscribe. The situation with Pat Goltz is almost a ditto.

I believe that they have misrepresented themselves to your committee, and in a manner unworthy of the dignity of the U.S. Senate. They are a part of a rightwing faction that has gained ascendancy, at least momentarily, of the National Right to Life Committee, and are working for an amendment that will not even allow abortions for life of the mother, and that will ban use of contraceptives as well as abortifacients.

I have spoken with Mr. Heckman at some length, and have referred him to the reason of the Rev. Warren Schaller, who was ousted from the offices of the NRLC. Protestants in NRLC . . . face this extremist threat seriously, since it jeopardizes our whole effort.

Because of their misrepresentation, I do not think you owe these people the opportunity to testify, and should rescind your invitation. I pray you will be able to do so. Wishing you wisdom in those momentous days, I remain,

In summary, how did all the fighting come about? How did Right to Life get to the stage where they were spending thousands and thousands of dollars on their own power struggles — and little time or money on the effort to achieve a pro-life amendment? Were they all villains? I don't think so. Quite the contrary. They were sincere people who — with the best of intentions — set up a bureaucracy and then found out that they could not control it. Yet they continued their struggle for power — a struggle that inevitably forced them to spend more and more of their time fighting each other until there was little time left to fight for the unborn child.

Or, as another director commented after the January 1974 meeting:

...I was embarrassed at the tone the 'questioning' took...

Most of you, the directors, know that I was not and am not involved in any of the maneuvering that, hopefully, is behind us now. Trying to get my own state moving has been more than enough to occupy me...

We say we respect life. Let us not forget that 'life' also includes the feelings and sensibilities of our friends.

Could we please start fighting the pro-abortionists?

Note the choice this particular director had to make. A person who wanted to be effective in developing his own state organization could not take part in the Right to Life power struggle.

Four years later, that power struggle, as we shall see in the next chapter, continues to go on.

NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE — 1976-1977

The struggles within the National Right to Life organization are so many that I can give only a few examples of them. We have already considered the battles that took place within NRLC's first six months of existence. Now let us skip over the next few years and study the operation of National Right to Life at the time this booklet is written. This would be the administration of Mildred Jefferson.

During the year 1976-77, we find National Right to Life operating on an estimated budget of \$400,000.¹ Of that amount, how much goes for effective efforts towards a Human Life Amendment and how much is spent either on bureaucratic concerns or on internal power struggles? Is it the same ratio that existed in 1973? Or the ratio that exists in the 1977 New York State Right to Life (1% for Federal legislation — 99% for other matters)? Rather than present my own estimate — which could be dismissed as the opinion of only one person - I urge NRLC to allow its supporters to review both its minutes and its financial report. That way each person can make an objective judgment about what is happening.

Like Ed Golden in 1973, Mildred Jefferson in 1977 believes in a strong president who dominates National Right to Life. While Golden was never able to win his power struggle with other members of the Executive Committee, Mildred Jefferson finds herself in a different position. As a black woman Protestant pro-life surgeon, she destroys the myth that the media has created about Right to Life people. As a result, she can reach out to much of the liberal community in a way that "Catholic conservative" pro-lifers cannot.

Since her public relations value is universally recognized within the pro-life movement, Mildred Jefferson is in the unique position of being more important to National than National is to her. Thus, unlike Ed Golden, she can effectively ignore the rest of the Board when she disagrees with them. For example, here is a brief excerpt from a June 1976 report by a member of the Executive Board of National Right to Life to his local state organization. It illustrates both the operating conditions within NRLC and the way National's funds are being used:

Salaries -- Mildred in the past few months has hired ten employees, exclusive of a bookkeeper. The total annual cost was not stated. No consultation was made with the hiring procedure formulated and directed by the Board at the prior board meeting.

Even more significant for our study, however, is the relationship of National Right to Life and the independent Right to Life groups:

¹This was National's protected budget at the beginning of the 1976-77 fiscal year. By the end of the year, NRLC had upped its sights and was discussing the possibility of a million dollar budget.

Excerpt from a Letter by a Member of the Board of the National March for Life Committee:

Although we're trying to avoid a public conflict, National Right to Life has been giving us all sorts of trouble. The difficulties have gone on ever since the March Committee was founded. Back in 1973, when we first brought up the idea of a March, National Right to Life told us that no March would be allowed since they would not have time to come to a decision whether a March was desirable. We had to tell them that we were prepared to go ahead with or without their support.

When they saw that the January 22, 1974 March was going to succeed, National then tried to claim all the credit. One of the members of our March Committee accidentally walked in on a press conference that National Right to Life had called to grab the glory for the January 22 activities. Here we were doing all the work and paying all the bills while they were posing for the pictures and sending out press releases!

Over the years, National has continued to try to control the March. On one occasion a National Right to Life official even threatened to hold National's convention on January 22 in another city so as to divert people from the Washington March.

Recently, National has devised a new way of competing with the March. Mildred Jefferson sent out a mailing wondering whether pro-life people were "doing the right things." As an example, she then contrasted the money spent on January 22 "to march around the Capitol for a few hours" with the money needed by National Right to Life for its office. Later, a second letter by NRLC's Vice President John Willke urged people to buy a National Right to Life banner (Cost: \$28) and take it to the March. This accomplished two things. First, it diverted monies needed by the March for Life Committee -- thus making it more difficult for us to pay our expenses. Second, it assured National of having a great many banners at the March. Just in case the television cameras or newspaper photographers were operating, there would be the National Right to Life banners.

Mildred Jefferson herself apparently boycotted our 1977 March although she was in Washington at the time for a National Right to Life meeting. (She had previously demanded a prominent speaking role at the March. When we explained that this year we wanted to have only a few legislators as speakers, she apparently decided to stay away altogether. At least nobody we met or spoke to saw her at the March and she is so well known in pro-life circles that it would seem impossible for her to participate without being recognized by somebody.)

As the March for Life official indicates, there is a certain financial practice that has been employed by NRL more than once. When another Right to Life group comes along with a successful project, a letter will be written by National Right to Life urging people to give money to National Right to Life for a similar project. For example, on April 28, 1976 in the middle of the Ellen McCormack campaign -- when the

McCormack pro-life commercials were appearing on television across the country - a letter from Mildred Jefferson urged support for National and announced that "Television commercials have been completed and are being shown in selected areas to determine their effectiveness in educating and informing the public." Any money donated to National for "television commercials" did not go to the McCormack television commercials. Is it not likely, however, that the average pro- life person would think that is where his/her funds would go — especially since the three television networks ban pro-life commercials unless they are linked with the campaign of a political candidate or with a referendum that is on the ballot?

It was almost a year later — March 11, 1977 — that Mildred Jefferson sent out another letter acknowledging that NRLC had not, in fact, placed its television commercials on national television. Why? Because explained Mildred Jefferson, "the economy, unemployment and the elections demanded that the money available be used elsewhere."¹

As for the future, the March 11, 1977 letter explained that National was having difficulty purchasing time for their television commercials. In other words, the money collected for television commercials would not be used for that purpose — at least with regard to "many television stations." The March 11 letter went on to ask whether National should sue the television stations for banning their commercials.

At the very best, therefore, people had been solicited for an ill- planned project. There is, however, a more disturbing angle. Ten months prior to the solicitation letter of April 1976, both Mildred Jefferson and other pro-life leaders were aware that the three major national television networks had a policy that would ban Right to Life television commercials unless they were linked to a political candidate or a referendum. In promoting the McCormack Presidential campaign in 1975, a background paper on this matter was distributed all over the country. The background paper not only quoted network officials as saying they would ban all education commercials on controversial issues but also emphasized that the Supreme Court had legally upheld the right of the networks to do this. Mildred Jefferson herself was personally informed of this policy of the networks.

Thus, at the time the April 1976 solicitation letter was sent out, Dr. Jefferson had been informed that the networks would ban such commercials and that the Supreme Court had upheld the networks in this regard. Nevertheless, those who received the April 1976 letter were not so informed. And -- more than a year later - still not telling contributors of the Supreme Court decision upholding such action by

¹Dr. Jefferson's explanation that the television commercials could not be funded because of the "economy, unemployment and the elections" is a difficult one to understand. First, as the previously quoted report from the member of NRLC's Executive Board indicates, the period of the April 1976 fetter coincides with the period in which Mildred Jefferson was hiring ten new employees for NRLC. If funds were available for such a major expansion of staff, then how can the economy be blamed for the decision not to spend lot the commercials?

Furthermore, as far as the elections arc concerned, NRLC is prohibited by its tax status from spending funds for political candidates.

the networks, National Right to Life was explaining its failure to place commercials by asking whether the contributors wanted them to bring a court case. If the contributors responded yes — not knowing that a similar court case had already failed — would another letter soliciting funds go out from National asking for money to finance the court case?

Yet a third example of NRLC's fund-raising letters occurred at the time that Americans United for Life — another independent pro-life group — began to raise funds for a court case in defense of the Hyde Amendment. Americans United wanted to challenge a lower court decision which had overturned the Hyde Amendment that had been passed by Congress in 1976 to ban the use of Medicaid funds for abortion except where the mother's life is in danger. For that purpose Americans United for Life set up a legal defense fund and arranged for pro-life lawyers to handle the court case.

It was in November 1976 that Americans United mailed a letter to pro-life people appealing for contributions in support of their legal defense fund. And it was also in November 1976 that Mildred Jefferson mailed a letter to pro-life people asking for contributions not to AUL but to National to support our appeals" to the courts on the Hyde Amendment. The National Right to Life letter closed with the statement:

We must raise \$93,000 in the next ninety days! The future of this whole movement depends upon you...Let your contribution demonstrate your continued commitment to the pro-life cause and to the saving of 375,000 lives."

It contained no mention whatever of Americans United. Yet, as National itself would later recognize publicly, the only pro-life legal effort in town on Hyde was the one being led by Americans United For Life.

Concerned about the NRLC fund-raising that duplicated their own efforts, representatives of Americans United met with National to see if the funds sent to National by contributors for a court case over the Hyde Amendment could be used by Americans United. After some negotiation, an arrangement was made that National would fund the Americans United effort at least to some extent.

Because Americans United for Life hopes that the present financial arrangement will turn out to be satisfactory, they are reluctant to put anything in writing about what went on at the meeting between the two groups. Nevertheless, there seem to be only two possible scenarios.

First, National could have agreed freely and voluntarily to give money to Americans United for Life. Perhaps they- even intended this all along. (1 here is a problem, however, in contending that National always intended the funds for AUL. While National material distributed after the agreement specifically mentions Americans United for Life, the November 1976 fund-raising letter speaks only of funds for "our appeals" and UM I IC reference to AUL. Furthermore, the AUL representative who talked with NRLC did not want National to send out

such a fund-raising letter. (The purpose all along was to support the Americans United appeal, then why was AUL not mentioned in the National fund-raising letter that went out to pro-life people at the same time as AUL's own fund-raising letter? Why was the AUL representative so concerned? And why did the National letter ask that contributions be sent to National instead of to the AUL defense fund directly?)

The second scenario is somewhat less pleasant. Since the National fund-raising letter about "our appeals" on the Hyde court action had the effect — whatever its intentions — of competing with AUL fundraising, this would put National in a position to exert a certain financial leverage on AUL which could not succeed in its legal effort without sufficient funding.

It should be noted, however, that if National had attempted to attach strings to the money before giving it to AUL — a counter attack would be available to AUL. If National collected money for a court case on the Hyde Amendment — and then neither initiated its own court case nor contributed to AUL — then National Right to Life could have been sued for damages by AUL and the suit would probably have been successful.

In summary, for those interested in further information on the AUL-NRLC situation, I would suggest that two key questions should be explored:

1) As the AUL-NRLC negotiations took place, did representatives of National ever threaten not to give the funds they collected to AUL unless AUL granted National certain concessions?

2) And, in turn, did AUL point out to National that they could be sued if NRLC refrained from giving AUL the funds and did not use the money National collected for a court case on Hyde?

As mentioned above, attempts to get written documentation from AUL about the meetings with National have been unsuccessful. It should be stressed again, however, that AUL's representative did say that they had not wanted NRLC to send out its November 1976 letter but that the present financial results seemed to be satisfactory and it might jeopardize relations if AUL publicly revealed what went on in the negotiations that led to this arrangement. (Is not such a comment in itself somewhat informative?)

Why is all this important? Because it involves the relationship of National with other pro-life groups. Was the November 1976 fundraising letter an attempt to help AUL? Or was it something else?

Once again we have a situation in which the "grass-roots" pro-life person must reach his own conclusion — and I hope the evidence will soon be made available so that this can be done.

The Call for a Constitutional Convention

In our first section, we discussed the controversy over the call for the constitutional convention within New York State. In late 1976 and 1977, this same issue created further controversy within National

Right to Life. In late 1976 a number of pro-life people began to advocate the constitutional convention call — Ellen McCormack, Robert Mauro of the Wanderer, Charles Rice, Randy Engel, Dan Buckley (a former staff member of Senator Buckley's office who formed Americans for a Constitutional Convention), and Professor John Noonan, to name only a few. These people differed very much from each other on other questions but, as far as National Right to Life was concerned, they all had one thing in common — they came not from National but from the other pro-life groups.

Stating that "control" of the Right to Life movement was involved, Mildred Jefferson began a counter-attack against the constitutional convention on behalf of National Right to Life.

The opposition from National Right to Life soon became so strong that it continued even when both Senator James Buckley and Congressman Henry Hyde made public statements in support of the constitutional convention call. Buckley and Hyde, previously held by National to be the congressional heroes of the movement, were now ignored. The resulting situation (downgrading the expertise of pro-life legislators while exalting the authority of National) was remarkably close to a similar kind of argument used by pro-abortionists on the Right to Life issue itself (downgrading the expertise of biologists while exalting the authority of the Supreme Court):

Arguments by Abortion Supporters Against Those Who Favor Protecting The Life of the Unborn Child

- 1) The Supreme Court has spoken. Whatever the merits of the issue, the decision of the Supreme Court must be accepted without question. Those who do not accept this decision are divisive.
- 2) Don't pay any attention to the biologists when they say that human life begins long before birth. We who advocate abortion know better. After all, they're only biologists and cannot be expected to be as informed as we are about abortion.

Arguments by National Right to Life Supporters Against Those Who Favor The Call for a Constitutional Convention

- 1) National Right to Life has spoken. Whatever the merits of the issue, the decision of National must be accepted without question. Those who do not accept this decision are divisive.
- 2) Don't pay any attention to Sen. James Buckley and Cong. Henry Hyde when they say that calls for a constitutional convention will help the pro-life effort in Congress. We in National Right to Life know better. After all, they're only congressmen and cannot be expected to be as informed as we are about Congress.

JOHN WILLKE AND THE "SMALL" PRO-LIFE ORGANIZATIONS

Our first section concluded with New York State Right to Life writing to state legislators about the "splinter groups" that disagreed

with them. The second section ended with the representative of a "large" pro-life organization in Pennsylvania contacting Sen. Birch Bayh in an attempt to downgrade Randy Engel because she "operates from her own dining room table."

On March 29, 1977, National Right to Life wrote a similar letter to Congress. Composed on National Right to Life stationery by John Willke, the Executive Vice President of NRLC, the letter enclosed an evaluation sheet which informed legislators that National Right to Life was the "only broad-based citizens' action group." On the other hand, according to Willke, Americans United for Life is "a small group" . The Ad Hoc Committee in Defense of Life "consists essentially of two men" . . . The U.S. Coalition for Life "is also largely the work of one person" . . . The March for Life is "a small group" ... and the Committee for a Constitutional Convention "consists of one man."

While recognizing that the "small" groups do valuable work "at times," NRLC concluded by recommending that "major contributions not be given to groups that have no representative base of members." (Willke made an exception for donations to the Americans United for Life Legal Defense Fund — which, as we have seen previously, National Right to Life had agreed to finance after some negotiations.)

The NRLC evaluation was especially hard on the Ad Hoc Committee in Defense of Life and the Committee for a Constitutional Convention. Co-incidentally, these two groups happened to be the two that were "competing" with National in extensive fund-raising appeals by mail throughout the country.

With regard to the Committee for a Constitutional Convention, the Willke report was blunt. "Whether you are for or against a constitutional convention," it concluded, "we would suggest that you work through presently existing groups rather than give money to this one."

While conceding that the Ad Hoc Committee did valuable work, NRLC then proceeded to tell the legislators that the Ad Hoc Committee's "pro-life philosophy is the same as the Right to Life groups except that they strongly support calling a constitutional convention, about which NRLC has serious reservations." (Note how by implication NRLC suggests that those who support the constitutional convention call are to that extent outside of the Right to Life movement. Yet at the time the Willke evaluation was compiled, NRLC's own poll showed more "grass-roots" pro-life people supporting the convention than opposing it. Would NRLC excommunicate all these people from the Right to Life movement — and, if so, does the excommunication apply also to Senator Buckley, Congressman Hyde and the other pro- life leaders who support the convention call?)

Besides mailing this evaluation sheet to Congress, a similar evaluation was sent to people on NRLC's mailing list and the material was also published in John Willke's Cincinnati Right to Life newsletter.

Question. What is accomplished by sending such an "evaluation" to Congress? It is hardly likely that many congressmen were planning to make financial contributions to pro-life groups. What the sheet does

accomplish, however, is to diminish the legislative effectiveness of the "small" groups by suggesting to the congressmen that such groups do not have a constituency and so can be ignored. Was that the true purpose of the congressional mailing?

As we reflect upon the three letters (New York State Right to Life, the Pennsylvania letter to Birch Bayh and the Willke effort), is there not an interesting paradox? All three letter-writers stress that their pro-life groups are larger than the "small" groups that disagree with them. Yet the letters are apparently written because the "small" groups were having a certain legislative effectiveness — and might continue to have such effectiveness in the absence of critical letters.

Thus, why did Birch Bayh invite Randy Engel and not the "large" Pennsylvania Group to testify at his hearings? As the testimony itself revealed, it was not because of friendship with Mrs. Engel. The truth seems to be that Randy Engel was invited because her efforts towards Congress had an impact — and she was a reality that had to be dealt with whether the legislators agreed with her or not.

Similarly, why did New York Right to Life send its letter on the call for the constitutional convention? If the "splinter groups" had no chance to get the call through the legislature, then why bother with such a letter? If the letter was motivated by a concern that the "splinters" might succeed, then how did these "splinters" become so legislatively effective?

In the same way, cannot the NRLC-WILLKE letter be viewed as an implicit admission that the "small" Ad Hoc Committee in Defense of Life was having a certain lobbying effectiveness among the congressmen — an effectiveness that created concern for NRLC, which apparently regarded itself as a competing pro-life group?

Now I am sure that some of the groups that were the subject of criticism in the three letters would respond that they are larger in size than the letters give them credit for. But the question I want to spotlight here concerns not size but effectiveness: Why were the "large" groups forced to resort to the extreme measure of sending out these letters? Is it because the "small groups" were somehow more successful than the larger ones in the lobbying process? If the groups that sent out the letters are bigger and have far more resources — then why are they relatively ineffective? Why do the "midgets" product so much and the "giant" so little?

In a later section we will study the question of bigness — and suggest some of the reasons that small groups often accomplish more than large ones.

Meanwhile, a final point should be made. Although letters to legislators criticizing other pro-life groups may achieve the immediate effect of helping those who write the letters, the long-range result is devastating for the entire pro-life movement. Once the legislators discover that (1) it is no longer sufficient to back pro-life legislation, and (2) there are competing factions within Right to Life that will actively shoot down all who disagree with them — then the Right to Life

movement has suffered a crippling and perhaps fatal blow. It is tragic that any pro-life group would employ such a dangerous tactic for a momentary internal gain within the Right to Life movement. One can only hope that similar tactics will never be utilized in the future.

Summary of Chapter on Recent Activity of National Right to Life

I know that this section will seem unfavorable to Mildred Jefferson and John Willke — as the previous section seemed unfavorable to Ed Golden and Marjorie Mecklenburg. The major contention of this book, however, is that the problems of NRLC are not the fault of Mildred Jefferson, John Willke, Ed Golden, Marjorie Mecklenburg or anyone else. Rather, it is the National Right to Life structure itself — and the assumptions upon which it operates — not the different personalities that control it — that create the problems National Right to Life has in its operation.

In the next chapter, we will look at two of these underlying assumptions.

CHAPTER II

WHY IT HAPPENED

THE TWO KINDS OF PRO-LIFE STRUCTURE

Up to this point we have factually detailed some of the conflicts that have taken place in Right to Life circles. We have seen power struggles — attempts to sabotage other pro-life projects — and bureaucratic concerns leaving only 2% of the time for effective pro-life projects. It is important for readers to understand that what has been presented is only the tip of the iceberg. For every Right to Life conflict that has been described, 20 others could have been given.

The purpose of describing these conflicts is to emphasize that most of them occur not because of bad will, but because the wrong kind of structure has been created within the Right to Life movement. The structures that have been created inevitably lead to power struggles and bureaucratic red tape.

To put it another way, many of the pro-life organizations are operating under an authoritarian structure. It is the contention of this book that they should instead be operating under a coalition structure. When the Right to Life movement has been successful, it is because it operated as a coalition.

In addition some of those who form pro-life organizations automatically assume that the bigger it is the better it is. In fact, it is often more accurate to say that the bigger an organization is the slower it is.

Let us consider both of these points in greater detail as we try to understand some of the structural problems of current pro-life organizations.

Let us begin by describing the two ways of operating — authoritarian and coalition — and then see the reasons why the authoritarian way cannot succeed with Right to Life.

The Authoritarian Structure vs. the Coalition Structure:

The basic assumption of the authoritarian structure is that a relatively few people ought to decide what all the other Right to Life people should be doing. Then, according to authoritarian philosophy, the "other" Right to Life people should obey orders.

The principal argument for this kind of structure goes as follows: "Unless you have some decision-making body in the Right to Life movement then everybody will do his own thing. We can't possibly be effective in that way. Therefore, there must be some authoritarian body to determine what pro-life people should be doing."

The people who think this way claim that Right to Life people who do not follow orders are "divisive." They sincerely believe that they "own" Right to Life in their territory. Thus, if the person involved is a state director and operates under the authoritarian philosophy, he

will believe that no Right to Life activity should take place in his state without his permission. If somebody does attempt something on Right to Life without permission, then the state director will usually refuse to cooperate and may even attempt to sabotage the project.

Why? Because the important consideration is to insist on the authoritarian principle. Whatever the merits of the Right to Life activity, nothing should be done without permission. The authoritarian principle is taken primarily from the business world and it should be noted that many businesses operate quite successfully under an authoritarian philosophy. A bank will have a board of directors who set policy for the bank. A supermarket will license a franchise in a particular area as its local affiliate. That store then has the exclusive right to operate for the supermarket.

So the basic question we have to ask is: Should Right to Life be like a bank? Should it be like a supermarket? In other words, should it operate under the authoritarian principle?

The Coalition Principle:

This principle operates under a different philosophy from the authoritarian one. According to the coalition principle, no Right to Life individual or group has the right to tell any other group what to do. Each pro-life group cannot have authority imposed upon them -- and each pro-life group cannot impose authority on anyone else. If a pro-life group comes up with a particular project, they do not have to get the permission of anyone else. However, no other group is required to cooperate. What the Right to Life group must do is to "sell" the project to other Right to Life groups on the merits. Those people that are convinced will cooperate in the project while those people who remain unconvinced will not.

Now the principal argument against such an arrangement is that it cannot work -- that it will lead to a situation where everybody is out on his own. But a study of successful Right to Life projects reveals the opposite. Pro-life projects succeed when they operate under the coalition principle. They fail when they operate under the authoritarian principle.

Effective Pro-Life Projects: 1. The New York

Situation

When we discussed the New York experience in the first chapter, we found that pro-life people succeeded in reversing the Rockefeller abortion law when they acted in the following way:

- a) They were project oriented — with an absolute minimum of centralized structure.
- b) Everyone had the freedom to operate — nobody had the power to order other pro-life people around.

- c) What central authority existed was not authoritarian but existed only • in order to serve the pro-life people and to help them make their efforts more effective (for example, the setting up of a bus schedule so that a different pro-life group could be in Albany each week.)

2. The March for Life Committee

This group runs a very effective March for Life each year in Washington. When we look at its operation, we see the following:

- a) It is project oriented — with an absolute minimum of centralized structure.
- b) Everyone has the freedom to operate — nobody has the power to order other pro-life people around.
- c) What central authority exists is not authoritarian but exists only in order to serve the pro-life people and to help them make their efforts more effective (for example, the setting up of a schedule for the day of the March itself — arranging bus transportation, etc.).

3. The Ellen McCormack Campaign

The Ellen McCormack effort ran pro-life television commercials throughout the country and enabled Right to Life both to gain media attention and to mobilize political efforts relating to the Presidential primaries. When we look at its operation, we see the following:

- a) It was project oriented — with an absolute minimum of centralized structure. (Although some central structure was required for collecting funds and reporting to the Federal Elections Commission — the group operated with a minimum of structure. For example, there was no central office in the campaign. There was not a single paid worker.)
- b) Everyone had the freedom to operate — nobody had the power to order other pro-life people around. (In some states Right to Life decided it did not want to support the McCormack campaign. Such wishes were respected. In those states that did decide to support the campaign, as much decision-making power as possible was given to the local group. The money spent in a particular state depended upon the money raised in that state and those raising the money within the state had the decision-making power on spending it.)
- c) What central authority existed was not authoritarian but existed only in order to serve the pro-life people and to help them make their efforts more effective.

Why the Authoritarian Principle Will Not Work:

There are two basic reasons that the authoritarian principle fails when applied to the Right to Life movement. The first is that the Right to Life movement is a movement of volunteers. The second reason is that, to be successful, the Right to Life movement must steadily increase the number of volunteers.

It is a basic principle of systems that a volunteer movement — unlike a business — cannot succeed on the authoritarian principle. The vast majority of volunteers will only do what they think is right. If volunteers do not think a course of action is correct, they will not adopt it simply because somebody else orders them. Thus persuasion — not authority — is essential.

For this reason a volunteer movement differs from a bank or a supermarket. If you are employed by a bank and you are ordered to do something that you believe is a mistake for the business, you will still carry out the orders. Why? Because your prime concern is to make a living. If you do not carry out the orders, you will be fired. Since it is more important for you to make your living than to see the bank make the best business decision, you will follow orders.

But a volunteer project is different. If you think it cannot succeed, you lose interest. Unlike the employee in the bank or the supermarket, volunteers must be convinced that what they are doing is right. For that reason, attempts to order volunteers to undertake activities of which they are not convinced are doomed to failure.¹

In addition, the Right to Life movement must steadily grow and increase in numbers if it is to succeed. A bank or a supermarket, on the other hand, needs only a fixed number of employees.

The authoritarian principle tends to produce a fixed number of workers because it concentrates decision-making power in a small group of people — perhaps one in each state for a total of 50 nationwide. When a group limits the decision-making power to a small number of people, it then becomes difficult to increase continually the number of volunteers. Most volunteers will not work on a project when they know in advance that their efforts can easily be stepped on by others.

A Diversion of Time And Energy From Educational and Legislative Projects

A final problem with the authoritarian principle is that in practice it often diverts time and energy away from efforts directed outward

¹There is, of course, a certain kind of volunteer who wishes to be involved only to a limited extent. Perhaps he wishes to give only half an hour a week to Right to Life. This kind of person may not wish to be involved in the decision-making process. He may be willing to take orders and to do something — even if he does not know the reasons. But the volunteers that really make the Right to Life movement run — those who work at it with unceasing effort and dedication — these people want to give not only their arms and legs to the Right to Life movement but their brains as well.

(i.e., toward educating the general public or lobbying Congress and state legislatures.) By setting up a center of power within the Right to Life movement, different Right to Life factions are encouraged to fight each other to obtain control of that power. This means that they must spend more and more of their time communicating and outmaneuvering each other. Those who refuse to do this — those who sit aloof from the internal power struggles and concentrate their time and energy on productive efforts directed toward the outside — these are the very individuals and groups that are likely to be stepped on by those who succeed in controlling the Right to Life center of power.

In other words, a dilemma is created. If you want to succeed in controlling the center of power within the Right to Life movement, you must give more and more of your time internally which leaves less and less time for effective pro-life projects outside. But if you do not spend almost all your time on this internal power struggle, then you will find that your pro-life projects are attacked and sabotaged by those who believe that you have no right to do anything without their permission.

An Example of Right to Life Conflict:

Let us take an example to show how the authoritarian structure magnifies Right to Life conflicts — while the coalition structure can reduce them.

In my own area, there is a Right to Life group that wants to raise \$60,000 to buy a bus for Right to Life lobbying trips. They contend that — over a period of years — the Right to Life movement will save money this way.

There are other pro-life groups that believe the allocation of \$60,000 for a bus would be a waste of money.

If these groups operated under the authoritarian structure, what would happen? First, the decision to spend \$60,000 for a bus would be made by a small group of people in the area who would be the "directors" of Right to Life. Theoretically, if they decided the money should not be spent, then the advocates of buying the bus are supposed to give up their project. On the other hand, if they ruled the other way, then those who believe the project is a waste of time are supposed to go out and raise money for it.

So what happens? Because the group that wants the bus believes it is crucial, they will begin to spend more and more of their time lobbying the "area directors" who will make the key decision. At the same time the group opposed to the bus will also be lobbying. Frictions will almost inevitably develop and charges will be exchanged on both sides. At the crucial meeting, the technicalities of parliamentary procedure are likely to be invoked all over the place. While this tremendous struggle is going on, both sides will have to decrease their efforts directed toward Congress -- because they are now consumed with winning a favorable vote from the pro-life area directors.

And when it is all over, the irony is that nobody will be really convinced. The losing side may well drop out of Right to Life — in which case the movement will lose a number of people who were previously very active. If they do not drop out, they may go off and form another organization — in which case it is clear that the authoritarian principle did not work. Or, if they take neither of these courses, they certainly will not work hard in support of the decision that has been made. Why? Because in conscience they cannot agree with it. Those volunteers who believe it is a waste of time to spend \$60,000 for a bus will not be exerting themselves in fund raising — no matter how much they are "ordered." And those who believe it is crucial to buy a bus will continue to lobby other pro-lifers on the question.

Now let us see how such a conflict is handled under the coalition arrangement. In a coalition, those who want to raise money for the bus can do so — but those who think it a waste of time are not forced to cooperate. The group that wants to raise \$60,000 has the task of persuading people to cooperate voluntarily. The success of their efforts depends upon how effectively they can sell each pro-life individual or group.

Since there is no center of power to order people around, the two groups with different ideas about the bus do not find it necessary to engage in a power struggle. Neither group has the temptation to seize control and force the other group to do its bidding. As a result, they have more time and energy to devote to projects directed outward and, despite their differences about the bus, they are likely to be on better terms than if they were bitter antagonists competing in an internal struggle.

Furthermore, despite initial appearances to the contrary, the coalition arrangement leads to increased cooperation among groups rather than to each group doing its own thing. Why? Because the projects undertaken by one group cannot succeed without the voluntary support of other groups. But because such support is sought by persuasion — rather than by attempts to force others to do what they do not believe in — the attempt to achieve cooperation has a much better chance of success.

All this, of course, is on the theoretical level. But I believe a study of the practical accomplishments of Right to Life will show over and over that the coalition principle works while the authoritarian principle fails.

BIGGER IS NOT THE SAME AS BETTER

A battleship is a thousand times bigger than a canoe. But is a battleship always a thousand times better than a canoe?

No! In fact, in some circumstances, a canoe is a thousand times better than a battleship.

Suppose it is absolutely necessary to travel down a certain river where there are many rapids. If you build a canoe, you have a good chance of making it. The lightness and maneuverability of the canoe is exactly what is needed to traverse the rapids.

If you build a battleship, you will go nowhere. The weight, size and power of the battleship will all work against you.

In other words, bigger is not the same as better. Paradoxically, a small organization often accomplishes much more than a large organization. Why? Because the increased size and weight of a large organization usually involve a corresponding loss of speed and mobility.

Right to Life must make a choice. It can build a single huge battleship. Or, because they are much easier to build, Right to Life can construct with the same effort a hundred canoes.

It is my thesis here that a battleship organization is a waste of time. Instead of forming one big organization of thousands, we need many small, local, independent groups of five to ten people.

If we think about it, why did Right to Life form its own organizations in the first place? Many of us started off working with Church groups. We assumed, for example, that the very size of the Catholic Church would give it tremendous effectiveness on Right to Life.

Ironically, we soon discovered that our small groups of four or five people could have more impact on the legislators than the Catholic Church which, in my area, has 120 parishes and a million members. Why? For two reasons:

- (1) For all its concern about abortion, the Catholic Church could not become involved in politics. Thus, the politicians tended to ignore the Church. An organization with five people who could become involved in politics had more impact than an organization with a million people that could not.
- (2) Like a battleship, the very size of the Catholic Church organization made it difficult to move. The inertia involved is enormous. For example, it took 2-1/2 years after the Supreme Court decision (from Jan. 1973 to Nov. 1975) for the Catholic Church to approve a Pastoral Plan for Pro-Life Activities. A year and a half later it is still not certain whether the Plan will get off the drawing board in many dioceses across the country. Why the delay? Was it caused by a lack of interest on the part of the Bishops? I do not believe so. It is simply that -- in an organization as large as the Catholic Church - it takes 2-1/2 years to draw up a plan.

Big organizations are so cumbersome and have so much red tape that it is sometimes difficult to tell whether they are moving at all.

Because we wanted the flexibility and swiftness of a small organization, we Right to Life people began forming our own groups — and then the paradox occurred. Having formed our groups because we recognized the need to separate ourselves from an organization that could not get politically involved and was too big to move rapidly, we ourselves began to form Right to Life organizations that could not get politically involved and were too big to move rapidly.

National Right to Life, for instance, has a budget of hundreds of thousands of dollars a year. Precisely because it spends and raises so much money, National Right to Life was forced to seek a tax status that prohibits its funds from being used for political purposes!

So, if pro-life people wish to become politically involved (a major reason for separating from the Catholic Church), we must now form organizations that are separate from National Right to Life. The same is true with most state Right to Life organizations.

And that raises a basic question. If political involvement is the most essential requirement for obtaining a Human Life Amendment, then why in the world are we spending time on organizations that cannot become politically involved? Why build battleships when canoes are needed?

LARGE VS. SMALL ORGANIZATIONS ON EDUCATION

Comparing the large organizations to the small organizations on political activity, we saw in the preceding section that the burden of political activity falls upon the small groups because of the tax structure of the large organizations.

How do the "canoes" and the "battleships" compare on pro-life educational projects directed toward the general community? Although both small and large organizations make contributions, the major effort seems to come from the small groups. For example, any list of the major educational projects undertaken by the pro-life movement would have to include (1) the educational television commercials about the unborn child that ran as a part of the McCormack campaign (these commercials reached an estimated 184 million people across the country); (2) the series of seven full-page pro-life advertisements taken by Women for the Unborn in the major Washington newspapers around the time of the 1973 Supreme Court decision (these ads, the first newspaper series of this size attempted by a pro-life group, presented pictures of the unborn child at various stages of development and contrasted the Supreme Court's abortion decision with the Dred Scott decision on slavery); and (3) the Human Life Review, a scholarly periodical aimed at members of the intellectual community and published by the "two men" (as the NRLC evaluation put it) who head the Ad Hoc Committee. It is not an accident, I believe, that all those projects were the work of the smaller pro-life groups.

What is the basic problem faced by the larger groups in carrying out educational projects directed to the general community? It is not one of talent. As individuals, for example, Dr. and Mrs. Willke have produced the effective Handbook on Abortion. Operating as a large group, however, the situation is different. National Right to Life has apparently found itself unable to undertake educational projects of the size and effectiveness of the smaller groups)

The reason seems to be the "overhead" expenses involved in the operation of the National group. These expenses must constantly be met and the need to finance internal organizational structures can often prevent money from being used for projects directed outward. (Recall how the NRLC educational campaign through television had to be delayed because the financial situation required "that the money available he used elsewhere.")

Furthermore, even when the Lund-raising appeals work well, there is a tendency to put the money into more and more internal structures (bigger offices, more paid employees, etc.) This provides an even greater "overhead" problem for the future.

¹For example, National Right to Life listed its quarter-page ad in the Washington Post as one of its major educational accomplishments of 1976. While all ads should be encouraged, compare this quarter-page ad with the seven full-page ads taken by Women for the Unborn.

This tendency — which has marked the large organizations in the past — seems likely to continue. In the January 1977 National Right to Life Report, Mildred Jefferson outlined her plans for the Right to Life movement:

Although we must have a Washington office as long as the nation's capitol is in Washington, I can see the time when all other NRLC offices will be in one location. I see NRLC owning its offices and a printing plant for producing NRL News weekly and providing the printing needs for all the NRLC-affiliated state organizations. I see NRLC Reading Rooms across the country like the Christian Science Reading Rooms that exist now.

Note that three items are proposed for future expenditures. One is that National Right to Life own a printing plant. This would involve the construction or purchase of a building. A second plan is that National Right to Life "own its offices" and have them all in one place — in contrast to the present arrangement in which National Right to Life rents offices. Although Dr. Jefferson does not mention the word, it appears this project would also involve a National Right to Life building — since it would not seem possible to own offices in a building that is owned by someone else. The third plan is that National Right to Life own a number of smaller structures — reading rooms — that would be built all across the country. (How many reading rooms should be constructed is not stated. It would probably depend upon the size of the budget. Since they are planned across the country, however, the proposal would seem to involve many such rooms — perhaps even hundreds of them.)

In considering these plans, let us contemplate for a moment what is required in terms of a regular financial intake to cover the enlarged "overhead" expenditures. In addition to the price of purchasing the buildings, there would be the price of furnishing them -- of continual maintenance — of salaries for those who would be in charge of the buildings. In other words, we are talking about a financial overhead that — even at a modest estimate — could run to millions of dollars. What the Right to Live movement becomes, in effect, is a multimillion dollar corporation.

Before undertaking such a project, should we not ask how much the ownership of these buildings helps Right to Life in its educational projects directed toward the general community?¹

¹In this regard, it might be helpful to look at the experience of the pro-life Churches that already own a great many buildings. I have had the opportunity to talk with a number of Church people who are in charge of pro-life educational programs. I asked them how much the success of their efforts depended upon the buildings and other material resources owned by the Church in their area. Most told me they saw little connection and reported that the key to success depended upon having a dedicated group of volunteers that would go out and establish contact with the general community. Where this was present, the education program had impact even if it was in an area where their Church had few buildings

It seems to me the major results of such expansion would be to require a continuing investment of great magnitude for "plant" purposes — an expenditure that would leave even less money for educational projects.

As somebody who has been involved primarily in the pro-life educational area, I would like to share my own experiences. The problem we usually face in pro-life education is not to find a good building. That can usually be accomplished without much trouble. The problem is not to find effective pro-life materials. We already have a great number. The problem is to get the "man-in-the-street" to come to the pro-life presentations. People tend to come only if they are already interested.

In other words, we face something of a "vicious circle." We set up pro-life presentations to interest the person who has been previously apathetic or uninformed. But these people will usually not attend the presentations unless they are already interested.

I believe such a problem would also be faced by the "Right to Life Reading Rooms." They would probably be largely unused except by those who are already interested in Right to Life — and these are the very people who do not really need such a reading room.

Instead of spending vast amounts of money on buildings that the people we need to reach will not visit, can we not spend our money on projects that go out and reach these people? I am talking about Right to Life programs involving regular advertisements in the daily newspapers — as well as door-to-door efforts where possible.

At any rate, the larger groups seem established in their plan to invest much of their resources in buildings and other "overhead" expenses. What it all means is that the burden of educational projects will fall on the small groups - not only for the present but for the foreseeable future.

and other material resources.

On the other hand, if there was no such group, the program would not succeed — even if it was in an area where their Church had many buildings and material resources.

The only advantage these religious leaders saw in the ownership of a building was that the structure could serve as a meeting place for the pro-life group and for their presentations. Even here, however, some pro-life groups reported that they drew more people and had more effective presentations when their educational programs were run in homes - rather than in the church building itself.

Should not such experiences be considered before we spend millions of dollars on buildings — especially since the money involved could otherwise be used directly for the educational projects themselves?

CHAPTER III
TWO SUGGESTIONS FOR AN EFFECTIVE
PRO-LIFE GROUP

In the last chapter we talked about the need to build flexible organizations that could move quickly.

How does one build such an organization? There is no set answer but here are two suggestions that could be helpful:

I. Pass a "75% Rule"

One step a pro-life group can take is to pass a hard and fixed rule that 75% of the meeting time must be devoted to projects directed toward the outside (e.g., toward lobbying Congress and the state legislature or toward educating the public on pro-life). Under this rule, no more than 25% of any meeting could be allocated to internal business and "internal business" would always be the last item on the agenda.

The same ratio could be established for the spending of funds. 75% of the funds would have to go to external projects - and only 25% to the internal needs of the organization. Adhering to such a rule would help to avoid the trap that so many organizations fall into - namely, spending 90% of their time on internal considerations rather than on projects directed toward the outside.

II. Give Each Member a Specific Project for Every Meeting

A second way to avoid stagnation is to ask each member to accomplish a specific project before the next meeting. The project should always be one that is within the power of the person to perform.

There are many "external" pro-life projects. Take letter-writing, for example. Each pro-life person is represented by two senators, a congressman, and usually two state legislators. Thus, even without considering the special situations that might arise within a district, the following letter-writing projects could be listed:

Project 1 - Letter-writing to Senator A. (The people working on this project would be asked to obtain a certain number of pro-life letters to Senator A from different people - for example, 20 letters a month.)

Project 2 - Letter-writing to Senator B.

Project 3 -- Letter-writing to Congressman.

Project 4 - Letter-writing to State Senator.

Project 5 - Letter-writing to State Assemblyman.

On the educational level, a major project could be to write letters on a regular basis to newspapers that are widely read within the community. These "letters-to-the-editor" would give the public information about the life of the unborn child and about organizations such

as Birthright that provide alternatives to abortion. While the newspapers might not print many of these letters, there is a good chance that some of them would reach the public — especially if letters on these subjects were sent regularly to the newspapers from different people.

A second project area could involve visits for lobbying purposes to the offices of the legislators and visits for educational purposes to key figures within the community, while a third project would concentrate on the compilation of an area list of pro-life voters that could be used in political contests. And a fourth project would be recruitment — asking pro-lifers to try, during the course of a year, to find one person who would be willing to become an active member of Right to Life.

In such an atmosphere, the primary purpose of the pro-life meeting would be to report on the project that each person is doing — and to share advice on how the projects could be more effective.

The size of the group should never be so large that a personal, working relationship with the other members cannot be formed. If the numbers ever grow to such an extent where personal discussion is not possible, then the group should be subdivided. Why? Because the major purpose of the meeting is to allow each member to seek help with any problems he may have encountered in his projects.

To illustrate the kind of organization I have in mind, a church I belonged to once had a parish council and a social action group.

The social action group met every week for one hour. The parish council met every month at meetings that averaged four hours. The council had 30 members while the social action group had only six.

The council meetings concentrated on internal matters. Much of the time was taken up with disputes between various council members. People were not given specific projects and they tended to do all their work (or, better, all their talking about the work) at the council meetings themselves. Formal parliamentary procedure was employed and a working relationship between the various council members was never really established.

The social action group, on the other hand, operated very informally. In fact, the first part of the meeting was taken up by casual conversation. Midway through the meeting, however, the chairman produced a list of the families in the area that needed help. Each member then chose one or two of these families — and they reported back on their progress at the next meeting.

Proceeding in this manner, the six members of the social action group were able to assist more than two hundred families in the course of the year. Meanwhile, by its own admission, the parish council had not given similar assistance to even a single family.

As I reflect on it it seems to me the social action group was successful because it followed a few simple rules. It spent almost no time on internal organization matters and all its time on projects directed towards assisting other families. As a small group, it was able to

develop a good working relationship among its members. (Even the casual conversation before the meeting "got down to business" served this purpose.) Each member received a specific project at every meeting — one that he or she could perform. The titles within the organization were so unimportant that nobody even bothered to contest an election. By general consent, the same individual acted as the chairman year after year. Nobody sought power within the organization because all effort was directed to the outside.

Now I recognize that there will be certain situations when formality will be needed and when internal organizational problems will have to be discussed. Nevertheless, I believe the model described above is generally the best one — namely, an organization that is action-oriented . . . that de-emphasizes titles and formality while emphasizing outward projects such as letter-writing to legislators ... and that is small enough so that its members can develop a working relationship.

CONCLUSION

In this booklet I have tried to recognize the good intentions of all pro-life people and the many positive accomplishments that have been made by individuals and groups -- and I have also attempted to suggest some ways in which Right to Life people might work together for future accomplishments. On the other hand, I also want to indicate how serious things are within the Right to Life movement -- because, unless the power struggles can be overcome, the outlook seems dim for a Human Life Amendment.

When a person suffers an injury, it sometimes stings very much to wash out the wound. However, it is a necessary process.

In the same way, I know that what I have written will sting - and I am sorry for that - but I hope it will also be curative.

The pro-life movement has been very successful in the past -- when it was not a Right to Life bureaucracy ---- when there was not an attitude that "no one should act on Right to Life without permission" -- when there were no power struggles. This booklet has been written in the hope that it will encourage pro-life people to return to the previously effective way of operating. If so, Right to Life can succeed in the future and we can attain our cherished goal of a pro-life constitutional amendment to protect every human life.

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